Economics Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Literally true: a theory can only be literally true when its terms may not be re-interpreted in a given situation. On the other hand, a reinterpretation can make some theories and laws applicable to special cases, without being true or false._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Literal Truth - Dictionary of Arguments
I 2 Literal Truth/literally/Field: requires existence assumption. - E.g. existence of numbers, so that the propositions of mathematics are literally true -> Idealism: as a mental construction - > fictionalism: instead: "true in a certain sense". Semantic ascent: the statement that something is "true, but not literally true". - (Field per fictionalism). I 4 Goodness: "good as an instrument"- in this case truth is not necessary. I 19/20 We should literally believe in electrons, but not in >mathematical entities, because these are not causally relevant. I 223 Literally true /Fraassen/Field: = the truth value is not eliminated by translation._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Literal Truth
